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H – 687

International Court of Justice

H0687-0002

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et seulement la partie réellement versée au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal) in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

Не публиковать до того, как представлено на публичном заседании трибунала и только ту часть, которая представлена в качестве доказательства.

H0687-0003

I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certifie qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministére Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1945.

Ich bestaetige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

Dr. Walter Siemers

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers.

H0687-0004

L I S T O F C O N T E N T S

of the

document books I -VI

Dr.h.c. Erich R a e d e r

H0687-0005

Description	Contents	Date	Exh. Raeder No.
	Re: Indictment concerning violation of the Treaty of Versailles.		
Reichs Official Gazette 1919 (Reichsgesetzblatt) page 949,951	Treaty of Versailles Article 188 to 191	1919	1
1.affidavit	Viceadmiral(ret.) Lohmann, Hamburg	9.4.1946	2
Reichsgesetzblatt 1919 page 1383 and foll.	Constitution of the German Reich article 47 and 50	11.8.1919	3
dto.1921 page 329 and foll.	Compulsory Service Law, article 8 and 36	23.3.1921	4
Reichstag Speech	Minister(ret.) Severing	20.1.1928	5
Lecture	Viceadmiral Dr.h.c. Raeder	23.1.1928	6
	Pressreport(Reichswehrministry) and plan for ship replacements for the Reichstag	Nov. 1930	7
2.affidavit	Viceadmiral(ret.) Lohmann	9.4.1946	8
	Re: Indictment concerning violation of the German Naval Agreement.		
Dok.d.dtsch. Politik, vol. III 1939	German-English Naval Agreement of 1935	18.6.1935	11
	Raeder, critical examination of the Naval Agreement	15.7.1935	12
University lecture	Viceadmiral(ret) Lohmann"The new plan for the development for the German Navy	Summer 1935	13
Dok.d.dtsch. Politik, vol.5 1939	German-English Naval Agreement	17.7.1937	14
Affidavit	Dr.Ing.h.c.Suechting, Hamburg	6.2.1946	15
Reichsgesetzblatt 1938 part II page 914-915	Modification of the German-Anglo Naval Agreement of 1937, London protocol	30.6.1938	16

H0687-0006

Description	Contents	Date	Exh. Raeder No.
	Re: Indictment concerning planning and conspiracy.		
Excerpt from:	Churchill, "Great Contemporaries"	1935	18
Excerpt from:	Hitler, "Mein Kampf"	1939	20 (19)
Reichstags Speech	Adolf Hitler	26.4.1942	21
White Book No.2 Doc.217	Joint declaration by Chamberlain and Hitler in Munich	30.9.1938	23
Speech	Speech by the Fuehrer on the Obersalzberg, notes made by General Admiral (ret.)Boehm	22.8.1939	27
White Book No.6 Doc.3	Gamelin to Daladier	1.9.1939	28 Rejected
White Book No.6 Doc.5	Weygand to General Gamelin	9.9.1939	29 Rejected
White Book No.6 Doc.10	Gamelin to Daladier	18.10.1939	31 Rejected
White Book No.6 Doc.11	Daladier to the French Ambassador in London, Corbin	27.10.1939	32 Rejected
White Book No.6 Doc.12	The French Ambassador in Brussels Bargeton to the French Foreign Office	9.11.1939	33
White Book No.6 Doc.14	Gamelin to the French Military Attache in London, General Lelong	13.11.1939	34
1809 PS	Jodl's diary	15.2.1940 3.5.1940	35
White Book No.6 Doc.19	Memorandum of the French Premier Daladier	19.1.1940	36 Rejected
White Book No.6 Doc.22	Memorandum of the Supreme Commander of the French Army, General Gamelin Extract	22.2.1940	37 Rejected
White Book No.7 Doc.131	Notes of the Commander in Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, on French-British military policy in the Balkans and the Middle-East	6.3.1940	38 Rejected
White Book No.6 Doc.25	Gamelin to Daladier	12.3.1940	39 Rejected

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Description	Contents	Date	Exh. Raeder No.
White Book No.6 Doc.27	Notes of the Commander in Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin	16.3.1940	41 ✓
Address	General Admiral Dr.h.c. Raeder on Memorial-Day	12.3.1939	46 ✓
	Re: Indictment concerning the case "Athenia"		
White Book No.6 Doc.38	General Weygand to General Gamelin and General Vuillemin	17.4.1940	Rejected 48
	Re: Indictment concerning Greece		
	a) Greek merchant shipping:		
White No.7 Doc.112	The French naval attache at Athens to the Commander in Chief of the French naval forces	5.10.1939	Rejected 50
Extract from	War-Dirry of the Naval War Command, December 1939	9.12. and 30.12.1939	53 ✓
White Book No.7 Doc.130	German Embassy in Hague to the Foreign Office	23.1.1940	54 ✓
	Re: Indictment concerning Greece		
	b) occupation		
White Book No.7 Doc.123	French military attache in Athens to the French Ministry of War	4.12.1939	Rejected 55
White Book No.7 Doc.125	General Gamelin to the Commander in Chief of the French Naval Forces	15.12.1939	Rejected 56
White Book No.7 Doc.126	Questionnaire established by the French general staff, (concerning Greece)	15.12.1939	Rejected 57
White Book No.7 Doc.128	Note of Commander in Chief of the French Army General Gamelin about a possible interallied intervention in the Balkans.	4.1.1940	Rejected 58
White Book No.6 Doc.41	Minutes of the meeting of the French War Committee on	26.4.1940	59 ✓
White Book No.6 Doc.48	Daladier to Gamelin	1.5.1940	60 Rejected
White Book No.7 Doc.134	French Admiralty to the French Foreign Office	19.5.1940	Rejected 62

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Description	Contents	Date	Exh. Raeder No.
White Book No.7 Doc.138	Address of the British Secretary of State for India, Amery in Newmarket	1.12.1940	63 ✓
White Book No.7 Doc.139	Address by Churchill before the House of Commons	19.12.1940	64 Rejected

Filed May 15, 1946

Raeder No. 1

Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement of Dr. Siemers, attorney at law:

I herewith certify, that the following extracts from the

Treaty of Versailles

Reich Gazette volume 1919.

are copied correctly.

Nuremberg, 11 March 1946

signed: (Dr. W. Siemers)

H0687-0009

H0687-0010

Article 188.

At the end of one month after this present treaty has become effective, all German submarines as well as lifting ships and docks for submarines including the pressure-dock must be surrendered to the allied and associated central powers.

Those among these submarines, ships and docks, which, in the opinion of the above named governments, are able to proceed or be towed under their own power, shall be delivered by the German government to ports assigned by the allied countries.

The other submarines as well as those under construction shall be completely broken up by the German government under the supervision of the named governments. The breaking up must be completed within 3 months after this agreement becomes effective.

Article 189.

All objects, machinery and materials, which are obtained through the breaking up of the German men of war of every type, surface vessels or submarines, must be used only for industrial or commercial purposes.

They must not be sold or given to a foreign country.

H0687-0011

Page 949

Article 190

Germany is forbidden to construct or to acquire war ships of any type unless they are to replace the commissioned units provided for by the present agreement (Art. 181)

The above mentioned replacements must not have a larger displacement than

10 000 tons for the battleships
6 000 tons for the small cruisers
800 tons for the destroyers
200 tons for the torpedo boats

Excepting the case of the loss of a ship the units of the different classes must only be replaced after a period of

20 years for the battle ships and cruisers,
15 years for the destroyers and torpedo boats,

counted from the day of the launching.

Page 951

Article 191.

The construction and acquisition of all submersibles, even for commercial purposes is forbidden to Germany.

Filed May 15, 1946

Raeder No. 2

A f f i d a v i t

I, Walter L o h m a n n , Vice-Admiral (ret), Hamburg, upon request of Dr. Walter Siemers, make the following affidavit. I assert under oath that the statements are true, and am aware that these statements are to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal and moreover know, that a false affidavit is a criminal act:

From 1928 - 1931 I was division-chief in the office of the Naval-Command. 1933 - 1936 I was staff-officer of the admiral of the Navy-Office Hamburg and during this time I gave lectures at the Hamburg Hanseatic University and outside on naval questions, for which I obtained the material from the High Command of the Navy. From the fall of 1937 until fall 1939 I was chief of the Navy-Budget-Department of the High Command of the Navy in Berlin. Following this I was commander of the Naval School at Muerwik and then until February 1945 Admiral of the Navy Office in Hamburg.

I, According to the Treaty of Versailles, the German Reich was neither to build nor to acquire U-boats. When in July 1922 the firm N.V. Ingenieurs Kantoor voor Scheepsbouw was established in The Hague, the navy acquired an interest in it in order to keep informed on U-boat construction.

H0687-0012

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The intention was, to make use of the experience gained thereby in the German Navy, when later on the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles would be annulled by negotation, and Germany would again be permitted to build U-boats. Moreover the navy wanted, for the same purpose, to train a small nucleus of skilled personnel.

The Dutch firm was strictly a construction-bureau.

The first German U-boat was commissioned 29 June 1935, the procurement of parts to build U-boats had started correspondingly earlier.

II. The document C 166 submitted to me, a communication fro the Naval-Command-Office of 12 March 1934, deals with the "preparation (Bereitstellung) of auxiliary cruisers", which - as stated in the document - were to be known as "Transport-ships O". These ships were not to be newly constructed, but were to be selected from the stock of the German merchant marine according to the specifications given in the document and were to be examined as to their suitability for this purpose. Then plans were made for reconstruction in case of necessity, but the boats remained in the merchant marine.

The order to select such boats from German ship-owners, was also received at the Navy Office Hamburg, where I was serving at that time.

III. Referring to documents C 135 and C 153, armament-plan, mobilisation plan, order of initial distribution (Aufstellungsgliederung, A.G.) and order of battle (Kriegsgliederung, K.G.):

H0687-0014

The above named documents, submitted to me, deal with the order of initial distribution, the order of battle, the mobilisation-plan and the armament-plan. The first 3 plans or resp. orders of distribution have essentially the same theme, and differ only in their manner of composition. The armament-plan differs from the other plans in as much as it deals only with new construction and the required new materials, and is hence less extensive.

The German Navy, like all the armed forces - and no doubt the armed forces of every nation - made such plans in order to be able, in case of a conflict or of war-entanglements, to prepare in time and use efficiently the means of combat on hand. Due to the change of conditions, military developments, change of personnel and the advances in the technics such plans were newly revised every year. An essential part of these preparations, self-evident for any armed forces, consisted in the order of initial distribution, mobilisation - or battle order, which gave a survey of all naval installations on land and sea, their local defences and their tactical subordination, - as well as of all war-material on hand and material to be secured within set time limits, or to be increased or newely organised. The military command based all its operative contemplations upon this order of battle (Kriegsgliederung, K.G.) while the political leadership judged from it the possibilities according to the number and strength of the available military means.

H0687-0015

The order of battle always had to be prepared with very much foresight and was issued by the High Command of the Navy (O.K.M.) usually 1½ years before it was to go in effect, so as to enable the responsible offices, to begin in time with the necessary preliminaries such as placing financial requests with the Navy-Budget-Office, requests for materials (steel, iron etc.), preparation of billets etc., in so far as all this was not already provided for in the peace-time expansion of the navy.

When Hitler in 1933 in his Five-Year-Plan, demanded an armed force by 1 April 1938, which he could throw into the balance as a instrument of political power, the initial order of distribution of 1938 (Aufstellungsgliederung) was worked out independently of the yearly planned initial order of distribution, and up to 1935 it dealt mostly with the possibilities not yet exhausted, of the Treaty of Versailles and with supplementing the naval force with craft which was not limited in type or number. After the Naval Pact of 1935, the planned order of battle 1938 was replaced by an "order of battle, final goal" (K.G. Endziel), in which the number of warships on hand and those to be built of all types was to be in the proportion of 35:100 measured by the tonnage actually on hand in the English Fleet. In consideration of the monetary and material possibilities, the capacity of the shipyards and the long time required to build large war-ships, this final goal was in the meanwhile set for 1944/45.

H0687-0016

There remained always the possibility to shift it again, depending on the building-program of the English Fleet.

The various terminologies have only a naval-technical significance and do not permit conclusions as to political plans.

IV. Within the bounds of the German-English Naval Agreement the German navy commissioned 4 battleships. As far as I can still determine with certainty the dates for the laying down, launching and commissioning I am stating them herewith:

	Laying down	Launching	Commissioning
1. "Scharnhorst"	---	3 October 1936*	7 January 1939
2. "Gneisenau"	---	8 December 1936	31 May 1938
3. "Bismarck"	1936	14 February 1939	2 August 1940 *
4. "Tirpitz"	1936	1 April 1939	1941
5. "H", planned, but later broken up, summer 1939			broken up.

* To dates with an asterisk I must remark that there might be a differenc of a few days.

Nuremberg, 9 April 1946.

Signed (Walter Lohmann)

I, Dr. Walter Siemers, attorney-at-law, certify that the above affidavit was today signed by Mr. Walter Lohmann, Vice-Admiral, ret., in person.

Signed (Dr. Walter Siemers)

H0687-0017

Ind May 15/1946

Raeder No. 3

Statement by Dr. Sieners, attorney :

I hereby certify that the following extract from the

Constitution of the German Reich

dated 11 August 1919

published in the Reichsgesetzblatt (official Gazette) 1919

II, Page 1383 and following,

has been copied correctly.

Nuremberg, 6th April 1946

signed : (Dr. W. Sieners)

H0687-0018

Article 47.

The Reichspraesident has the supreme command of all the Armed Forces of the Reich.

Article 50.

In order to be valid , all decrees and orders issued by the Reichspraesident, including those pertaining to the Armed Forces, must be countersigned by the Reich Chancellor or the competent Reich-Minister. By the act of countersigning, responsibility is accepted.

H0687-0019

Introd May 15/1946

Raeder No. 4

Statement by Dr. Siemers, attorney :

I certify herewith that the following extract from the

compulsory service law (Wehrgesetz)
of 23 March 1921, published in the
Reichsgesetzblatt (Official Gazette)
1921, I Page 329 and following

has been copied correctly.

Nuremberg, 6th April 1946.

Signed : (Dr. W. Siemers).

H0687-0020

Article 8.

The command lies exclusively in the hands of the lawful superior.

The Reichspraesident is the Commander in Chief of all Armed Forces. Under him, the Reich Minister for Defence (Reichswehrminister) has authoritative power over all the Armed Forces. At the head of the Reich-army is a General, as Chief of the Army-Command, at the head of the Reich-navy, an Admiral, as Chief of the Naval-Command.

Article 36.

Service men are not permitted to take part in politics. Within their sphere of service military officials are likewise forbidden to take part in such activity.

Soldiers are not permitted to belong to political societies, nor may they attend political meetings.

For soldiers, the right to vote or to take part in a plebiscite in the Reich, or in the provinces (Laender) or in the communities is suspended. The regulations of the Peace-Treaty of 28 June 1919, regarding the right to take part in the plebiscites mentioned therein, remain unaffected.

Members of the Armed Forces have the right of a free choice of newspapers. The Reich Minister for Defense may prohibit certain newspapers, if their contents are dangerous to military discipline and order or to maintenance of the constitution.

Filed May 21, 1946.

Reader No. 5

Statement by Dr. Siemers, attorney:

I certify herewith that the following extract from the document:

Speech by Carl Severing, Reich Minister, ret.,

to the German Reichstag on 20 January 1928

has been copied correctly from the lecture notes which minister Severing personally handed to me. Severing gave this speech to the Reichstag as the representative of the Social-Democrat Party.

Nuremberg, 19 April 1946

Signed: (Dr.W. Siemers)

H0687-0021

H0687-0022

Extract

Speech by Carl Severing, Reichsminister, ret., to the German Reichstag, on 20 January 1928.

Now the armored cruiser. The fact that a government, which knows precisely what gigantic sums we must raise during the coming year, should make such demands, is, to say the least, very remarkable. It says, the Peace-Treaty permits it - yes, but the Peace-Treaty also decrees the payment of reparations. The 9,3 million Marks demanded for this year will play their decisive part only in their consequences and these consequences require several hundred million Marks, to raise which during the next few years seems to me absolutely impossible.

Considering the development of weapons for naval warfare, I am unconvinced also of the military value of armored cruisers. It may be that armored cruisers are the backbone of the defence at sea, as the government says. But, to form an active fighting unit, (Gefechtskoe per) a backbone must also be made up of other members, of U-boats and airplanes, and as long as we are not allowed to build these, armored cruisers are of very little value even for defence.

H0687-0023

Intst May 15, 1946

Raeder No.6

Statement by Attorney at Law Dr.Siemers:

I herewith certify that attached document,

Letter of Chief of Naval Command, Raeder,
of 8 October 1928 to Reichsminister of the Interior,
Severing, inclusive of the attached enclosure

is correctly copied from the original.

The origianl was placed at my disposal for the purpose of copying it by Reichsminister(retired)Severing.

Nuernberg, 13 April 1946

s.(Dr.W.Siemers)

H0687-0024

Chief of Naval Command

Berlin, 8 October 1928

W 10, Koenigen-Augusta-Strasse 38-42

To

Reichsminister of Interior

Seve[illegible]ng

In connection with our discussion of 5 October, copy of a lecture delivered by me literally at Kiel and Stralsund in the beginning of 1928, herewith forwarded.

s/ Raeder

Admiral, Dr.h.c.

H0687-0025

L e c t u r e

delivered by Vice-Admiral Raeder, Dr.h.c.
during History-week at Kiel,23 January 1928 and the creation of a chair in the City-council (Ratsstuhlstiftung) at Stralsung, 8 February 1928.

Even as I, the representative of the Wehrmacht, upon the invitation extended to me so cordially,have agreed to say a fe words in this circle,it would be appropriate that,as the autho of several volumes of the official Naval Warfare book,I should advance an opinion on questions of the history of Naval-Warfar or that,- as former inspector of the educational system of the Navy - I should speak on the significance or handling of instru tion in history at the naval vocational school, the great orga nisation for the preparation of our soldiers for civilian occu pation. This, however, is not my intention. Rather I have in terpreted this invitation to mean, that these after- dinner speeches are to serve the purpose of getting the participants this event of the History-week acquainted with one another an with their special sphere of work. And I believe therefore, tha I serve this purpose and also you and the Wehrmacht represente by me better,if I tell you something about the character of ou present Wehrmacht. This is much closer to my heart, insofar as the one who has no direct connection with the Wehrmacht, who d not know it from his own observation, but only reads, what att are being worked up against it by some news papers in a grand style, must gather a completely wrong and incorrect impression of it. In view of this,I can and wish to assure you from my in most conviction and on the basis of my extensive knowledge of conditions, that the Wehrmacht - I am speaking of course prima ly for the Navy, but I know that it is not different in the Army- since after 1919,its inner solidarity and penetration ha been perfected with the greatest devotion and loyalty to duty, in its present structure, whether officer or soldier, in its

H0687-0026

present form of development and its inner attitude, is a firm and reliable support, I dare say- even on the basis of its inherent military might - with respect of conditions within the Reich - the firmest and most reliable support of our German Fatherland, the German Reich, the German Republic and its constitution and that the Wehrmacht is proud of the fact, to b just that. Of course, this could not, to the fullest extent be true from the first moment of the organising the Reichswehr on. For a Wehrmacht solidified and similar in structure and inner conception, cannot be build in 2 or 3 years. For such a tas years of tenacious, devoted work, education in the literal sen se of the word are required. That in the first period, in the years of uncertainty, which prevailed throughout the country, many a man or officer could not find himself and consequently left us volumtarily or had to be removed because of short comings is not amazing. Especially the idea, considered by man that it should be possible, to increase the strength of the Wehrmacht in spite of the provisions of the Treaty of Versaill be it with weapons or material or by increasing personnel, b.e it for strengthening the border patrol or to combat revolutionary tendencies of radical elements has created a great deal o unrest and has through a distorted and exaggerated view of the press caused distrust towards the aims of the Reichswehr.

I do not have to emphasize, that the inner consolidation of the Reichswehr in the last 2 years under guidance of Field-marshal v.Hindenburg as Reichspresident and at the same time Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy has made especially gr progress. This is due to the unifying influence, cleaning the atmosphere, which our Reichspresident, Field Marshall General v.Hindenburg, exerts upon all walks of life.

H0687-0027

Today, the Reichswehr, Army and Navy, in the hands of its superior officers, of the Chief of the Command of the Army and Navy, of the Reichswehrminister, who, according to Article 8 of the National Defense Act, exercises, under the Reichspresident, authoritative power over the entire Wehrmacht, and of the Reichspresident himself, is a positive instrument of power, which will do its duty irrespective of whether it be employed to defend the frontiers or to maintain law and order within the country. Whoever wields this instrument possesses the power in the state. If however, the State, is to endure, this power must be available only to the constitutional authorities. No one else may have it, that is, not even the political parties; the Wehrmacht must be completely nonpolitical and be composed only of service men who, in full realization of this necessity, refuse to take part in any activity of domestic politics. To have realized this from the outset and organized the Wehrmacht accordingly is the great and enduring achievement of J o s k the former Reichswehrminister, whom the worthy Minister Dr. G e s s l e r followed, on this road with the deepest conviction. I do not have to mention here what a Wehrmacht, in which service men were perhaps recruited according to the strength of the political parties, would mean to the internal security of the State. It is therefore correct and no other way can it be considered than that the recruiting of young men for the Navy - I wish to confine myself here to speaking only of the Navy in order to keep to subjects on which no one can doubt my authority - in both recruiting offices at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven should take place merely from the point of view that we wish to have good service men. Young men to be recruited must come from decent families and must spiritually and bodily, be in every respect suitable to be service men. No questions are asked on their political opinions; with respect to this, information is merely gained from Police-authorities to ascertain whether the person concerned has acted in an unconstitutional manner. Since we have had an almost overwhelming inrush of candidates in the last few years we were in a position to select those types who were superior in a soldierly sense. In Kiel in 1926, of 44,100 candidates, about 1,44% were recruited and in 1927, of 22,800 candidates, about 1,49%.

H0687-0028

The training in the Wehrmacht is also carried out only with the view of creating a first class service man, out of this human material, a personality full of character to serve the State. Next in importance is the preparation of the servic man in the Naval Technical School, for his later civilian occu pation, which has as its chief objective his training to be a worthy citizen of the State.

In my opinion, one thing is of course a proviso for th correct attitude of the service man, namely that he is willing to put his profession into practice when the Fatherland calls upon him.People who never again want war cannot possibly wish to become soldiers. One cannot blame the Wehrmacht for impar- ting to its service men a manly and warlike spirit, not the desire for war or even a war of revenge or a war of aggressior striving after which, in the general opinion, would certainly seem a crime to all Germans, but the will, to take up arms in the defense of the Fatherland in its hour of need. It is self evident that, in training a man to be a true soldier, who distinguishes himself by loyalty, devotion to duty and readine for sacrifice, like his comrades in the great war, the milita examples of the great past of Prussia and Germany must play a great part. For no educational work can be accomplished withou historical tradition, without military examples which the sol- dier has to emulate in the performance of his truly not easy professional duties. This is why there is the meticulous respect for tradition in the individual units of naval forces and troops which is certainly no trifle, but an important and significant educational means of cultivating military vir- tues.

It must be understood - for it is in accordance with the essence of a Wehrmacht - that it is important to be as far as possible in a position to fulfil its tasks, even under the conditions today, dictated by the Versailles Treaty.

H0687-0029

The Wehrmacht builds its hope upon the truth of the often proven noble words of Fichte: -" It is not the might of an army nor the proficiency of weapons that achieves victories but the strength of the spirit " - and upon the word with which Napoleon, on the occasion of writing his life history, embraced his thoughts: " There are only two powers on earth the spirit and the sword; eventually however, the sword will be vanquished by the spirit." It must remain the hope of the Wehrmacht as well as the hope of every good German that the German spirit, the manful spirit and national honor will aga struggle to the fore among all sections of our people in the Fatherland. It is our conviction that a people cannot permanently continue its existence, when, totally disarmed and surrounded by States who have organized all the strength of their people to achieve superiority of arms, it is deprived of the right of conscription and of the right of each man to take up arms in the defense of the Fatherland in time of need and that such a condition is unworthy of a free people.

To present you with more details on the present activities of the Wehrmacht - here I am only concerned with the navy - would take up too much time. I should therefore like to cite just a few points of the activity of the navy, which demonstrate the necessity of its existence even in our present situation. Just picture the extent of the German coastline in the Baltic and North-Sea, chiefly the Prussian coastline, which would be subject to attacks and ravages of even the smallest maritime nations, had we not at our disposal modern manoeuverable naval forces at least up to a strength permissible by the provisions of the Versailles Dictation. Above all, think of the position of East-Prussia, which in the event of a shutting down of the Corridor would wholly rely on overseas import, an importation which would have to by pass directly, bases of foreign nations and in the event of war would be endangered to the utmost, or even be made impossible, if we were not in possession of fighting ships . Further bear in mind reports about the effect of visits of our school-ships and our fleet in foreign countri according to which already in 1922 through the model conduc of ship crews an improvement of internal conditions of the Reich was deduced

H0687-0030

and the esteem of the German Reich thus helped considerably and whereby through the appearance of our warships the unity, national pride and esteem of Germandom was strengthened and increased to an excellent degree. May Ialso remind you of the time when, a few years after the collapse of our country, the survey boat "Meteor" in intelligent cooperation with men of science and of the navy aroused admiration through its accomplishments in the sphere of oceanic exploration and that the navy in this instance also contributed, to augment the esteem of the Reich through its peaceful activities. We have convincing evidence that these peaceful activities effect a gradual change in the cautious attitude of foreign countries, as can be noted in the increase of orders to German industrial firms. That, through the military requirements of the navy the home industry is benefited and spurred to higher accomplishments, which in a sense will benefit the entire German people is not difficult to prove.

I must content myself, today, to refer briefly to activities of the navy without going into details on its mission in the sphere of furthering merchant shipping,the requirements of which, I take it, are known to this circle.

Finally, only one more thing. The Wehrmacht is deprived of a firm basis, if it is not rooted in the people and not born by their confidence. Even if today the Wehrmacht has hold of only a small fraction of the people, the German Wehrmacht is rooted in the German people. It is composed of sons of all German tribes, who serve their country shoulder to shoulder in loyal comradeship, an admirable picture of unity which, after the fervent desire and labour of the Reichspresident, should and must again prevail throughout the German population if it is to fully recuperate and witness again the rise of Germany. But, Gentlemen, the Wehrmacht must also enjoy the confidence and understanding of the German people. I hope that my words will awaken or strengthen that confidence in you, so that you can contribute to building this link from the German people and especially from German youth, in whose education you participate to a high degree by means of instruction in history, to a constitutional German Wehrmacht.

H0687-0031

Filed May 15, 1946

Räder No. 7

Memorandum of Attorney at law Dr. Siemers:

The first two pages of the following document are a pressreport from November 1930 made by the Wehrmacht office (Political Section of the Reichswehrminister working under von Schleicher). This follows from the file No. W III d in the top left corner of the document. It is a communication to the press before the beginning of the debate in the Reichstag 1930/31 about the budget 1931.

The Appendix: "The plan for ship replacements consisting of 11 pages had - as page 1 of the pressreport shows - been submitted to the Reichsrat and the Reichstag. The submitting parliament of the plan for ship replacements was due to a Reichstag decision.

I received the copy of the document personally from Viceadmiral Lohmann.

Nuernberg 26 February 1946

Signed: Dr.Siemers

1.) Due to an indiscretion details of the budget of the Reich, which as a rule, are made public only when they are submitted to the Reichstag, were made known to the public already in these days when the budget was submitted to the Reichsrat. In the appendix the test of these indiscretions, as far as they concern the Reich Ministry of defense are noted down.

2.) The publication contains on the whole correct indications. Several mistakes and omissions are added in brackets. The plan for ship replacements was submitted to the Reichstag due to a decision of the latter.

3.) The plan for ship replacements does not mean re-armament. It comprises the finishing of Armoured ships "A" Replacement Preussen and the new construction of 3 further Armoured ships B,C,D, probably taking up the time till 1938, and several smaller craft. It is only a matter of replacing old and useless ships, which had been used up and become obsole a long time ago.

4.) It is not impossible that at the present disarmament conference at Geneva the plan for ship replacements will be looked upon as re-armament. Thereto we state that in the Versailles dictated peace treaty the establishment of the German navy was fixed in every detail. Germany has disarmed and has reduced its defensepower to that level which the enemy powers had aimed at. The preservation of this standard according to the plan for ship replacements can , therefore, neither surprise nor alarm anybody and can by no means be interpreted as re-armament.

H0687-0032

H0687-0033

5.) Confidential: The plan for ship replacements submitted at present contains the plans of replacing (half of the armoured ships only. Therefore it is classified part I The other half of the ships will be dealt with in a later plan for ship replacements (part II), that will chronologically follow part I and will be applied to the years 1937 and following. Therefore notice is t be taken expressly of the fact that the needs of the navy have not been completely met yet by the plan in question. However, it is not desired to draw the attention of the public to the plan for ship replacements part II and its demands.

6.) Material to the plan for ship replacements is enclosed. We draw attention to the material sent on 2 May 1930.

H0687-0034

The Plan for ship replacements

A) The effective strength of the Navy

Limited by the peacetreaty in the free building-up of the armed forces, the Reichstag set down in the law dated 23rd March 1921 the effective strength of the Reich's Navy:

6 Battle-ships
6 Small Cruisers
12 Torpedo-boats and
12 Destroyers

The replacing of these ships and craft is permissible, according to the peacetreaty, at the earliest after 20 years (battle-ships and cruisers) and 15 years (Torpedo-boats and destroyers). In execution of peacetreaty later-on 2 reserve ships for the battle-ships and cruisers and 4 reserve-boats for each group: destroyers and torpedo-boats were conceded.

The effective force of war ships, remaining to the Reich on liquidation of the war, was already completely obsolete at the time. This force has been replaced step by step for the cruiser and destroyer class in compliance with the spirit of the law of 23rd March 1921. In the meantime the battle-ships of the Deutschland-class have reached an age of 24 to 28 years. By demanding the means to build the Armoured Ship "A" the Reich government began in the year 1928 to replace the battle-ships. About the granting of this ship an exaggerated, bitter, innerpolitical fight ensued, extremly enlarged by the ship-questions being drawn into the electoral contest. So as to avoid a repetition of similar innerpolitical discussions when further ship-grantings would have to be considered, the Reichstag

H0687-0035

decided in its 89th session of 18th June 1929: to ask the Reich government to submit a plan of construction extending over a longer period of time.

The necessity on principle, to renew our obsolete stock of battle-ships was recognized also by the government of Reichchancellor Mueller. Already on 15th August 1929 the "Frankfurter Zeitung" wrote:

"Any expert knows that a single ship is today a half-ness or even less. The Navy would not be doing their duty, if in the years to come, they did not keep on repeating and putting forward, that an armoured cruiser reached its full value but as a member of a squadron. It will not be easy to oppose these demands with technically valid reasons and it can be foreseen with certainly that they will be made in-spite of all bureaucratic appeasing memorandas."

B) <u>The Plan for ship replacements.</u>

To the budget for 1931 is added, according to the decision of the Reichstag mentioned, a Plan for ship replacements. For the meantime only Part I of the Plan is submitted. Part II is reserved for the time following the accomplishing of Part I.

Part I that is now submitted provides in the first place for the very urgent replacement of the four oldest battle-ships. Part II will certain the replacement of the other four battle-ships that were left to us as well as the last three cruisers. These seven ships have also already passed the age necessary for replacement set down by the Treaty of Versailles.

H0687-0036

Heading the list of the expenditures of the Reich-Navy which occur only once we find in the Reich-budget-project for 1931, the following paragraph: Settlement of the question of replacment.

a) War ships (Battle-ships, Cruisers, Destroyers and Torpedo - boats are - except in case of loss-replaced when their period of life comes to an end.

The period of life amounts to:

20 years for battle-ships and cruisers.

15 years for destroyers and torpedoboats to be counted from the day of launching.

b) Auxiliary war ships.(all other vessels and craft) are replaced according to their degree of wearing out and their aptness for their special purposes.

c) For the period from 1931 till 1936 to begin with, the replacing-constructions are settled in the "Plan for ship replacements" Part I (Appendix 4).

This paragraph of the Budget came to the knowledge of the public by an indiscretion already at the time of the sittings of the Reichsrat. The enclosure 4 of the Reich-budget, which represents the Plan for ship replacement is added in its orginal edition. As the plan shows, to begin with, several half completed ships and craft (the battle-ship "Replacement Preussen", the cruiser "Leipzig" and the artillery schoolingboat "Replacment Dache") are to be finished. As far as the costs for the above fall in to the period beginning 1931

H0687-0037

they are included in the "Plan for ship replacements." The "Plan for ship replacements" Part I comprises the years 1931-1936. The completion of other craft, which had been started at the end of the period of time provided for in part I stretches into part II. The plan comprises as new replacement constructions 3 battle-ships (Ersatz "Lothringen" 1931-1934, "Ersatz Braunschweig" 1932 - 1936, "Ersatz Elsass" starting 1934. 4 spare destroyers 1934 - 1936, 5 Torpedo-boats starting 1936, 5 escorts (UE-boats) from 1931-1932. 1 Artillery school-boat "Ersatz Hay" from 1936 on, 6 mine-sweepers 1935 - 1936, 7 blocking practice craft 1931-1932. A yearly instalment of 50 million Marks is provided for the execution of the "Plan for ship replacements". The battle-ship "Ersatz Preussen" is being finished at the "Deutsche Werke" at Kiel. "Ersatz Lothringen" is to be constructed at the navy ship-building-yard in Wilhelmshaven. The wharfes where the ships "Ersatz Braunschweig" and "Ersatz Elsass" will be built are still kept in reserve.

The building of the battle-ships will be streched out over a long period of time, so as to have the Navy wharf Wilhelmshaven occupied continously. The ideal time of construction is about 3 years. This would occupy the wharf intensively but for a comparatively short time only. A stretching of the time of construction over 4 years is, considering the costs, still tolerable and is therefore provide for. A further stretching of the duration of the construction time would render the construction too uneconomical.

H0687-0038

The costs for the construction of battle-ship "B" in Wilhelmshaven amount to 73 million marks. For battle-ship "A" the costs amount in Kiel to 75 million. The difference in price is explained by the fact, that the German Works Kiel A.G. (Ltd.) demand a construction cost supplement, which does not enter into consideration at the Navy-Wrarft, because there the cost of construction as a whole is payed by the Reich.

C) Reasons for the Plan.

Out of fundamental considerations the Government has decided to present the plan together with the budget. Its acceptation by the Reichstag would mean an approval of the governments, the politics, which aims at an undinimished preservation of the power of defense.

The military considerations on which the plan is exclusively based, are layed down by the following captions.:

1. Utilization of the "Armed forces".

Since the German Republic has - as the only one of the Great Powers - carried out the disarmament of their Armed forces, which serve the protection of her frontiers and the preservation of peace, the following possibilities had to be taken into consideration for the employment of the Armed forces:

a) Defense against robbing of territory ,

b) Defense of neutrality in case of conflict of others.

Ad a) Defense against robbing of territory.

Should in the whole of the history of the world upto 1918 no arbitrary robbing have happened, the ten post-war-years (Wilna, Memel, Fiume, Bessarabia) would prove the

H0687-0039

possibility (and probability for a country without arms). Eastprussia, cut-off and being a province not sufficiently yet prepared for its defense, is an especially tempting target.

Ad b) Defense of Neutrality.

Though strong forces are trying to secure peace in the world (League of Nations, Kellog-part, Pan-Europa), every friend of peace will discover, that neither 4 years of World-war nor 10 million of fallen warriors have been sufficient, to guarantee world-peace for all future. The speeches of French statesmen, continously repeating themselves prove, how little security of peace there is in Europe and how easily conflicts leading to war may arise, whether it be far or near.

2. Tasks of the Navy.

Within the National defense the Navy forms a part of the Armed Forces and a complementary part to the Army that cannot be replaced by anything else. It protects vital Sea-transports (East-Prussia) - by a heavily armed barrier of fortresses on the Vistula Poland has blocked the road over land to East-Prussia - takes part in any combats in coastal areas and protects the flanks of the army against attacks from the sea. It takes from the army the concern of flank and rear protection and thereby sets free troops and artillery for other tasks. In case neutrality has to be protected the navy protects and defends German territorial waters and ports against misuse by belligerents.

H0687-0040

3. Fulfilment of tasks.

The German Navy consists of 7 old battle-ships, 4 new cruisers and 4 old ones, 12 new destroyers and 20 old torpedo-boats. For combat against men-of-war, the old cruisers and the old torpedo-boats which are fit only for escorting and security-service, do not count. Whithin a reasonable space of time we may add: a new armoured ship and a new cruiser. The old battle-ships were so obselete at the end of the war, that they were de-commissioned . They are now 24 to 28 years old and will be 29 to 37 years old before they will be replaced . However, they are seaworthy and could reach a considerable age provided they were used like merchant-vessels for peaceful purposes. In case of war they represented floating coffins. They are no longer a match to modern arms of attack (Grenades, torpedoes, mines, bombs) dating from years (1902 to 1906) in which these weapons of destruction were still undeveloped and did not cause the distructions reached by the models of our days.The loss of the "Pommern" in the world war drew attention to that 'fact' in a menacing way.

To accomplish its tasks the Navy, according to its present tonnage, can count up to now on the following battle-ships: one armoured cruiser, seven old battle-ships, five light cruisers, twelve destroyers. These armed forces are not sufficient means for the navy to accomplish its tasks. The growing age of the battle-ships continues to diminish there effectiveness. The cruisers and destroyers are not armoured and incapable either of effectively participating in coastal combats or of defending successfully the sea-flank of troops on land.

H0687-0041

They serve as escort and reconnaissance boats. The accomplishment of the tasks mentioned as well as the escorting of troop transports to East-Prussia can only be expected from ships of the class of the armoured cruiser "Ersatz Preussen".

The armoured cruisers mount heavy artillery of six 28 cm guns and of medium calibre ... of light 15cm guns. They therefore present especially by their heavy artillery an extraordinary weapon for combat, permitting an effective participation in coastal combats. Against airplanes the ships are protected by about 20 AA guns each, by smoke producing apparatus and by their speed (26knots). They are far more difficult to hit by bombing attacks than are the clumsier dreadnoughts of old. The inferences raised by the public, that ships were inferior to airplanes are treated extensively in an enclosure. Against unexpected hits the ship is protected by its armour. Against submarines there is a very developed system of under water compartments. Instead of the former large machine rooms there are small motor rooms. Attacks by submarines are probably made considerably more difficult by the high speed of the ships. Their comparatively small draft allows them to penetrate into shallow waters, in which submarines can either manoeuvre only with difficulty ... or not at all. Here attention may be drawn to the fact that in the world war submarines actually were successful only against older unprotected armoured cruisers resembling the old battle-ships of the Reich-Navy. In spite of various U-boat hits not a single dreadnought was destroyed by U-boats

H0687-0042

quite as rare were U-boat successes against quick, easily manoeuvrable ships, like the present German type of armoured cruiser. The only German battle-ship that was destroyed and sunk with its full crew in a few minutes time during the last war by a submarine torpedo was the battle-ship "Pommern". That ship belonged to the class of ships of the present Reich-Navy, which the Reich Government is anxious to replace by modern armoured cruisers.

The old battle-ships too mount an artillery consisting of four 28 cm and fourteen 15 cm guns. But the lack of speed of these ships lowers the value of their guns, because, it is doubtful whether they can be utilized in combat at all if they have not been disabled or destroyed by superior modern combat-units before.

To the efficacy of the artillery essentially increased by the high speed of the armoured cruisers, the further development of the guns adds a supplementary increase of the force in combat. The new guns surpass in range the heavy artillery of the old ships by 12 km and fire a weight of projectiles threetimes as large per minute.

4. Increasing the morale of crews.

As the Navy has to execute positive war-tasks, as explained above, in case of war, it must have efficient and modern ships at its disposal. The fighting morale of the crews is undermined when captain and crew must take up combat on obsolete ships vastly inferior to the enemy with regard to speed and fighting capacity.

H0687-0043

The Reich-Navy tried for years, to keep the completely obsolete battle-ships up to date as to the technical gear and armament by means of auxiliary constructions. The grafting-on of modern apparatus on to old ships has exceedingly complicated the survey and use of all the ships arms. As a consequence training of officers and men suffers. Training can only reach its maximum under the condition that modern shipsbuilt in a clear purposeful way are at our disposal.

D) Circumstances to be specially considered.

The following circumstances are mentioned, though they do not decisively influence the question discussed.

1.) The enormous strain, under which the machines of a man-of-war must work, in order to serve their purpose have weakened and worn down machinery and boilers of the old battle-ships. The bunker-bulkheads and inside-floors are eaten away in places by rust. Already now about one million marks are spent every year for repairs which not even restore to the ships the value they had when they were new far from mentioning modern courbat value.

2.) The number of workers of the Navywharf Wilhemshaven which was reduced in the last years from 8250 (1926) to 7200 (1927), 6700 (1928), 6500 (1929) and 5100 (1930) would have to be scriously reduced again, if the "Plan for ship replacement"were not accepted as proposed. So as to keep the workers of thewharf in 1932, the Navy wharf would have to receive the plans for the preparation of work at the beginning of the financial year 1931. Otherwise the number of workers in 1932 would fall down to 4060. If the "Plan

H0687-0044

for ship replacement" is accepted a number can be maintained in the average of about 5300 men during 1930-34 (thereof about 4000 for new constructions, repair work and work about the wharf that goes with it) and in 1935-1936 a member of workers of about 6000 (4700) men, the minimum for the enterprises being able to work economically.

3.) Of the cost of an armoured cruiser 80% are workers pay. Counting the cost of an armoured cruiser with 75 million RM (Reichmark) that would amount to 60 million. Supposing an average earnings of a worker to be 2500 RM per annum, an average of about 6000 workers can find employment for 4 years. Of that number, 900 workers would be working at the wharf where the armoured cruiser is being built the others work at other factories producing machinery, parts and unfinished manufactured products and are spread all over the Reich as the enclosed list shows.

H0687-0045

Filed May 15, 1946

Raeder No. 8

A F F I D A V I T .

I, Walter L o h m a n n , Vice Admiral, retired, Hamburg, at present in Nuernberg, by request of Dr. Walter Siemers, Attorney, Hamburg, at present in Nuernberg, submit the two appended comparative lists of ships built under the terms of the Versailles Treaty and/or the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935.

I certify expressly under oath that the information given is true, and in this connection I am aware that this statement is to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg, and I am also aware of the fact that making a false statement in place of oath is a punishable offence :

I. Comparative list of the ship construction that Germany was permitted under the Versailles Treaty and the ships she actually built :

1. Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build

8 armoured ships

Germany, however, only built

3 armoured ships

i.e., "Deutschland", "Admiral Scheer" and "Graf Spee", totalling 30,000 tons. "Graf Spee" was not commissioned until 6th January 1936.

H0687-0046

2. Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build

8 cruisers

Germany, however, built only

6 cruisers

i.e., "Emden", "Koenigsberg", "Koeln", "Karlsruhe", "Leipzig", totalling 29,400 tons, and the 6,000 ton "Nuernberg"; the cruiser "Nuernberg", was, however, not commissioned until 2nd November 1935.

3. Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build

32 destroyers or torpedo boats

Germany, however, built only

12 destroyers and no torpedo boats

According to the Versailles Treaty, the size of the torpedo bboats was to be 200 tons each. No such torpedo boats were built, because no type of this size would be practicable.
According to document C 141 - US 47 dated 10 February 1932, the tonnage of the E-boats built was, as far as I remember, 40 tons each.

II. Comparative figures with regard to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18th June 1935 and 17th July 1937 :

In the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, the comparative strengths of the German and British fleets was fixed at 35 : 100.

H0687-0047

For the British Fleet , with a total of 1,201,700 tons is taken as the basis, 525,000 tons of which are battleships.

Accordingly, Germany was granted a fleet totalling 420, 595 tons

and battleships totalling 183, 750 tons

At the time of the Naval Agreement of 1935, Germany had three completed armoured ships totalling 30, 000 tons

and, therefore, was permitted, according to the Naval Agreement, to commission further battleships totalling 153, 750 tons

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Actually Germany commissioned :

1.) Two battleships ("Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau") whose tonnage was planned and also given in document C 23, presented to me, as 26,000 tons, actually it was 31,300 tons each - 62,600 tons

2.) Two battleships ("Bismarck" and "Tirpitz"), whose tonnage was planned and also given in document C 23 presented to me, as 35,000 tons each, actually it was 41,700 tons each - 83, 400 tons

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that is, a total of 146, 000 tons

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Nuernberg, 9th April 1946.

signed Walter Lohmann.

H0687-0048

I, Dr. Walter Siemers, Attorney, certify that the above statement in-place of oath has been signed today by Walter Lohmann, Vice Admiral, retired, by his own hand.

signed Dr. Walter Siemers.

H0687-0049

Filed May 16, 1946

Raeder No. 11

Exhibit Raeder No.

Statement by Dr. Siemers, attorney at law:

I certify that the following document:

"German-English Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935"

is correctly copied from

"Dokumente der deutschen Politik"
Vol. III Berlin 1939.

Pp. 120 - 123.

Nuernberg, 23 April 1946

signed (Dr. W. Siemers)

H0687-0050

The German - English Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of to-day's date, in which you were so good as to communicate to me on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the following:

"1. During the last few days the representatives of the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been engaged in conversations, the primary purpose of which has been to prepare the way for the holding of a general conference on the subject of the limitation of naval armaments. I have now much pleasure in notifying your Excellency of the formal acceptance by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the proposal of the German Government discussed at those conversations that the future strength of the German navy in relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion of 35:100 . His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regard this proposal as a contribution of the greatest importance to the cause of future naval limitation. They further believe that the agreement which they have now reached with the German Government, and which they regard as a permanent and definite agreement as from to-day between the two Governments, will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on the subje of naval limitation between all the naval Powers of the world.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom also agree with the explanations which were furnished by the German representatives in the course of the recent discussions in London as to the method of application of this principle. These explanations may be summarised as follows:

a) The ratio of 35:100 is to be a permanent relationship, i.e., the total tonnage of the German fleet shall never exceed a percentage of 35 of the aggregate tonnage of the naval forces, as defined by treaty, of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, or, if there shoul in future be no treaty limitations of this tonnage, a percentage of 35 of the aggregate of the actual tonnages of the Members of the British

H0687-0051

Commonwealth of Nations.

b) If any future general treaty of naval limitation should not adopt the method of limitation by agreed ratios between the fleets of different Powers, the German Government will not insist on the incorporation of the ratio mentioned in the preceding sub-paragraph in such future general treaty, provided that the method therein adopted for the future limitation of naval armaments is such as to give Germany full guarantees that this ratio can be maintained.

c) Germany will adhere to the ratio 35:100 in all circumstances, e.g., the ratio will not be affected by the construction of other Powers. If the general equilibrium of naval armaments, as normally maintained in the past, should be violently upset by any abnormal and exceptional construction by other Powers, the German Government reserve the right to invite His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to examine the new situation thus created.

d) The German Government favour, in the matter of limitation of naval armaments, that system which divides naval vessels into categories, fixing the maximum tonnage and/or armament for vessels in each category, and allocates the tonnage to be allowed to each Power by categories of vessels. Consequently, in principle, and subject to (f) below, the German Government are prepared to apply the 35 per cent. ratio to the tonnage of each category of vessel to be maintained, and to make any variation of this ratio in a particular category or categories dependent on the arrangements to this end that may be arrived at in a future general treaty on naval limitation, such arrangements being based on the principle that any increase in one category would be compensated for by a corresponding reduction in others. If no general treaty on naval limitation should be concluded, or if the future general treaty should not contain provision creating limitation by categories, the manner and degree in which the German Government will have the right to vary the 35 per cent. ratio in one or more categories will be a matter for settlement by agreement between the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in the light of the naval situation then existing.

H0687-0052

e) If, and for so long as, other important naval Powers retain a single category for cruisers and destroyers, Germany shall enjoy the right to have a single category for these two classes of vessels, although she would prefer to see these classes in two categories.

f) In the matter of submarines, however, Germany, while not exceeding the ratio of 35:100 in respect of total tonnage, shall have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government, however, undertake that, except in the circumstances indicated in the immediately following sentence, Germany's submarine tonnage shall not exceed 45 per cent. of the total of that possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government reserve the right, in the event of a situation arising which in their opinion makes it necessary for Germany to avail herself of her right to a percentage of submarine tonnage exceeding the 45 per cent. above mentioned, to give notice to this effect to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and agree that the matter shall be the subject of friendly discussion before the German Government exercise that right.

g) Since it is highly improbable that the calculation of the 35 per cent. ratio should give for each category of vessels tonnage figures exactly divisible by the maximum individual tonnage permitted for ships in that category, it may be necessary that adjustments should be made in order that Germany shall not be debarred from utilising her tonnage to the full. It has consequently been agreed that the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will settle by common accord what adjustments are necessary for this purpose, and it is understood that this procedure shall not result in any substantial or permanent departure from the ratio 35:100 in respect of total strengths.

3. With reference to sub-paragraph (c) of the explanations set out above, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have taken note of the reservation and recognise the right therein set out, on the understanding that the 35:100 ratio will be maintained in default of agreement to

H0687-0053

the contrary between the two Governments.

I have the honour to confirm to your Excellency that the proposal of the German Government is correctly set forth in the foregoing note, and I note with pleasure that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accept this proposal.

The German Government, for their part, are also of the opinion that the agreement at which they have now arrived with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and which they regard as a permanent and definite agreement with effect from to-day between the two Governments, will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on this question between all the naval Powers of the world.

I have the honour to be,

Signed: von RIBBENTROP,

Ambassador Extraordinary and

Plenipotentiary of Germany.

Filed May 1st, 1946

H0687-0054

Raeder No 12

Statement by Dr. Siemers, attorney - at - law:

The enclosed document is a letter by the Commander - in Chief of the Navy (Raeder) of 15 July 1935.

File No: Mar. B No. SK 211/35 geh.

It is correctly copied from a copy or a transcript among the papers of Vice Admiral Lohmann which I personally received from him.

Nuernberg, 16 April 1946

Signed: (Dr. W. Siemers.)

H0687-0055

The Commander -in-Chief of the Navy

Mar. B. No. SK 211/35 geh.

Berlin, 15 July 1935

S e c r e t!

For the information of the officer's corps the following critical examination of the German-English Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935 is presented.

The thoughts expressed in the critical examination may also be expressed in dealing with personalities outside the Navy.

The agreement resulted from the decision of the Fuehrer to fix the ratio of the fleets of Germany and England at 35:100. This decision, arrived at after deliberations on European politics formed the point of departure for the London conferences. This decision was imperturbably adhered to and our demands were altogether met. The underlying purpose of the Fuehrer's decision is the will to exclude the possibility of antagonism between Germany and England for all future times and, consequently, to exclude naval rivalry between the countries for ever. Thus, the political prerequisites for the agreement are different in principle from those for our former naval laws.

The agreement is completely satisfactory to the Navy. It would hardly be possible to fulfil a considerably larger program during the next decade than permitted by the agreement.

H0687-0056

The possibility is given to us to create a modern, appropriately organized Navy adapted to our maritime needs. Through the agreement the construction of the German Navy to the extent fixed by the Fuehrer was formally approved of by England. According to the British agreement valid at present the following tonnage figures result:

Capital ships	183,750 tons
Aircraft carriers	47,250 tons
Heavy cruisers	51,380 tons
Light cruisers) Destroyers)	119,770 tons
U-boats	23,700 tons (45% of the British tonnage).

Because the Washington and London naval agreements containing the English agreement figures on which these German figures are based expire at the end of 1936, new figures will be substituted for them effective from January 1937 on. In all probability this will be the actual British figures in each group.

With regard to light cruisers and destroyers the figures will be larger than the ones valid at present.

From a long-range point of view dependence on British naval armaments can only lead to inconveniences should other navies grow far beyond their present strength and should in that case England not maintain her Navy at the present proportion to these powers by increasing it accordingly. Should the German Reich get into an unbearable situation as a result of

H0687-0057

such a case, the clause of item 2 c provides for the possibility of approaching the British Government about an eventual change of the ratio. In the field of politics the agreement signifies special success because it represents the first step to practical agreement and because it brought about the first step to relaxation of the inflexible front up to now kept up against Germany by our former enemies, hich was demonstrated recently at Stresa in particular vigor.

Draft, signed: Raeder

Distribution to all command posts and offices of the Navy.

H0687-0058

Filed May 16, 1946

Raeder No. 13

Statement of Attorney Dr. Siemers:

The enclosed document "The New Plan for the development of the German Navy" are the notes of a lecture by Vice-Admiral Lohmann, which he - then Captain - gave in the summer of 1935 at the Hanseatic University in Hamburg. Vice-Admiral Lohmann personally handed this document to me in Hamburg.

Nuernberg, 26th February 1946

signed: (Dr. Siemers)

H0687-0059

The new plan for the development of the German Navy .

We are still under the spell of the great events of this spring, which have fundamentally changed the military-political conditions in Germany since last year. The clever and far-seeing policy of our Fuehrer has presented us with 3 events, which on the one hand made our fatherland the center of interest for the whole world, but on the other hand also altered our domestic policy and filled us old soldiers especially and also our youth with great enthusiasm. I am thinking of the proclamation of the National Defense Law (Wehrgesetz) and the law concerning the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht, dated 16th March, the great speech by the Fuehrer on 21st May making definite demands for Germany's military-political development and, finally, the Anglo-German Naval-Agreement of 18th June 1935. When the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor in his proclamation of 16th March 1935 to the German people and to the world, broke the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles and restored the unrestricted military sovereignty of the Reich, it was clear that this statement concerned not only the Army and Airforce, but also the Navy, even though nothing had yet been said as to its strength. The Fuehrer wished to wait, to see what effect the decision to enlarge the Armed Forces would have on the country, and above all to take Britain and the general disarmament-plans of the naval powers into consideration. It was, however, clear from the outset to our former enemies, who still liked to construe new German violations of agreements out of each of the various German statements, that military sovereignty also concerned the Navy. It was equally clear, that there was no opposition to this development in Germany, the justification for which could not be disputed by anybody.

H0687-0060

Therefore it could not have surprised anybody, had Germany, with regard also to the naval armament, presented the world with an accomplished fact, especially since the incontestable right of equality of armament had again been made clear to the whole world in the Fuehrer's speech on 21st May. The Fuehrer, however, chose another way. He preferred to negotiate on the state of German Naval armament direct with Britain which, as our onetime enemy, has tried for years to show understanding for our difficult position. Since these questions had already been previously discussed in personal talks with the British Foreign Minister in Berlin, the direct negotiations with Britain were started in London during the week before Whitsun. In comparatively short time these negotiations led to the result that the future strength of the German Fleet was to be 35% of that of the Fleet of the British Empire and it was further decided how this decision should be carried out. According to the reports of members of the commission, some of whom I myself spoke to, the main difficulty in the negotiations was that the British assumed that the demand for 35% was to be a starting point for bargaining, as has been the rule so far in diplomatic negotiations, and were very surprised when the German Ambassador, v.Ribbentrop, said that this 35% was the unalterable decision of the Fuehrer which he would not change, that the strength proposed was already so low, that it represented the minimum that Germany would consider. When the British negotiators had swallowed this pill, the negotiations continued smoothly and quickly.

H0687-0061

To begin with public opinion in Britain regarded the negotiations in London with suspicion. The old fear of Germany's aspiration for world domination, which had already arisen before the war and was fed by ruthless propaganda during the war, was still too deep rooted in the British people. Even the official statements spoke only of preparatory conferences. The more surprising then was the ratification of the treaty which expressed the full agreement of both governments, and did not, like some armament-treaties of former times, leave more embitterment than understanding in its trail. The sense of fairness, which British statesmen, along all the often very dirty paths of higher politics, have not lost, broke through in view of the unreserved uprightness of the German declarations, the worthy decision of the German representatives and the passionate will for peace, which inspire the speeches and acts of our Fuehrer. Unlike former times, the speeches of the British leaders expressed respect and recognition. And this has been acknowledged by us as a sign of an honest preparedness to understand. Hardly less valual than the attitude of the official leaders are the voices from the circle of British war-veterans. For example : When, in November 1918, the German Fleet was taken by British squadrons to be interned in Scapa Flow, the British C-in-C Fleet, Lord Beatty, the great enemy of our Cru Cruiser Admiral Hipper, gave the famous signal : "Do not forget that the enemy is a contemptable beast," this C-in-C Fleet expressed on several occasions his dislike for Germany. But on 26th June, the same Beatty stated in the House of Lords :" I am of the opinion that we should thank the Germans.

H0687-0062

They came to us with hands outstretched, announcing that they agreed to the comparative strength of 35 : 100. If they had offered other proposals, we could not have prevented them. It is truly a thing to be thankful for, that there is at least one country in the world whose competition in armament we have no need to fear."

I think it would interest you to hear something from an expert about the origin of this treaty and its effect on the development of the German Fleet.

In order to understand what importance this success, this great historical event has, not only for Germany, but also for the other naval powers, it is necessary to consider the basis for it quickly. The German Fleet, then the second strongest naval power, was destroyed due to the Treaty of Versailles.

Demands of the armistice. Size of the German Fleet. Reconstruction. Material.

The other great naval powers, England, USA, France, Japan and Italy met in Washington in the fall of 1921, at an invitation of America,

H0687-0063

H0687-0064

class A and in return Britain was allotted a larger tonnage of class B cruisers. For destroyers, a standard size of 1500 tons, for 16% 1850 tons was stipulated, of which Britain and America received 150,000 tons each, Japan 105,500 tons. 10% transfer of B cruisers. All powers were to be allowed to have U-boats of a total tonnage of 52700 tons. No single U-boat should exceed 2000 tons, only 3 each up to 3800 tons.

With this agreement the total strength of the British fleet would be 1,201,700 tons. The agreement now fixes the strength of the future German fleet, i.e. the German fleet may total 420,595 tons as against 144,000 tons according to the Treaty of Versailles. This ruling is valid until the agreements of Washington and London expire on 31 Dec. 1936, since Japan gave notice in the fall of 1934. We hope with Britain that a new agreement will soon replace it. In addition to that a general naval conference is to be convened before the end of the year. For the time being, however, the strength, fixed by the British agreement is valid for us until the end of 1936.

It is laid down in the Anglo-German agreement, that Germany will apply the comparative figure of 35% to the individual categories of ships, i.e. she cannot use the 420000 tons to build 42 battle-ships of 10 000 tons or 420 U-boats of 1000 tons, but must stay within the limits, which corresponds to Britain's strength in the individual categories of ships With a certain compensation, however.

Large battle-ships: According to the Treaty of Versailles only 10,000 tons. Of which now 3 = 30,000 tons. Britain has 525,000 tons, Germany therefore is entitled to 183,750 tons. Therefore 153,750 tons still available. How many ships can be built out of that depends on the size fixed. At present still 35,000 tons. England wants 25,000 tons, France

H0687-0065

and Italy are now building 35,000 tons. Germany, therefore, could build either 4 or 6 battle-ships.

Aircraft-carriers: Germany has none as yet. Size agreed upon is 27,000 tons Britain aims at 22,000 tons. Germany could build 2 of this size. Naturally, here and in all other categories of ships, she is free to use smaller units and build more ships. This has been left to all signatories of the agreements, their special needs and military considerations.

Cruisers: Having a limit of 10,000 tons for heavy cruisers Germany has the possibility of building 5 ships of this type, which she did not have yet. 51,380 tons are at her disposal.

For light cruisers a total tonnage of 67,270 tons is available. To these the 6 cruisers, from the "Emden" to the "Nuernberg" are to be added, which were built after the war, of which all except the "Emden", have 6000 tons = 35,4000 tons. Of the remainder of about 32,000 tons (31,870*) either 3 ships of 10,000 tons or 5 of 6000 tons or 8 of 4000 tons could be built, the deciding factor being the caliber of armament.

Destroyers: A total of 52,500 tons are available. Of these 9,600 tons are to be subtracted for the 12 boats of the "Moewe" and "Wolf" classes, built according to the Treaty of Versailles with their insufficient size of 800 tons. That still left 43,000 tons. The fact should be noted that Germany received the right, to build destroyers out of the cruiser tonnage and vice versa, like France, in other words "light forces". However, a division into 2 categories is preferred. As the normal size should be 1500 tons, nearly twice as much as our present size, we could build 28 of such boats or, if we choose the size of 1850 tons, which is also possible 23 boats.

*) written with pencil)

H0687-0066

U-boats: Of special importance. It is striking, that, with regard to the U-boat tonnage, a higher percentage, compared to the other classes of ships has been agreed upon for Germany, namely 45% instead of 35%. No agreement was ever reached on the question of U-boats in any conferences up to now. Owing to Britain's experiences during the war and the fact that she was endangered by a U-boat war, she demanded the abolition of U-boats and, when this did not come off, at least a limit of 250 tons for coastal defence. The others, especially France, turned it down. The 3 main powers then reached an agreement in London about an equal tonnage of 52,700 tons. France did not participate and could therefore continue to arm freely, so that, today, it is the strongest U-boat power with more than 96,000 tons. She has 96 completed and 15 under construction.

Defined U-boats as indispensable means of defence and demands 90,000 tons*)

At the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1932, England repeated her proposal for abolition of U-boats or limitation to the size of 250 tons. Both were rejected as well as the American proposal to distribute the U-boat tonnage evenly with 35,000 tons. Of the about 300 existing U-boats of the 5 great naval powers the average size is 1,000 tons, 600 tons are already defined as "coastal boats". The largest one ("Surcouf") is 2880 tons and has 20 cm guns.

Germany always agreed to the abolition of U-boats. After the war, she had to hand over, scuttle or destroy 315 U-boats. She waited in vain for 16 years, not only for abolition by others but also for a decrease in the number and size, until in April of this year she at last started on the construction of U-boats

*) written by hand into margin

H0687-0067

250, 500, 2 x 750 tons*)

of the smallest size proposed by Britain.

Owing to the failure of the efforts at disarmament, Britain, in a generous way, has now come the conslusion in the agreement, that Germany be also given the right to possess U-boats and of same tonnage that she has herself, namely 52,700 tons. Germany answered this generous gesture by saying that she will limit herself to 45% of the British tonnage, in any case that she will not exceed this, without giving previous notification. Should she take full advantage, of her rights, she must however not exceed the 35% of the British tonnage /i.e. any additional amount must be deducted from a surface-category.

With 45% of the British tonnage, Germany now has the opportunity of using 23,700 tons to build U-boats. This would amount to about 94 boats of 250 tons, a size now under construction, or 26 if after the completion of the small U-boats now under construction, we were to build more of 800 tons, or 20 if of 1,000 tons. What the British Fleet, in detail, will look like by the end of 1936 cannot yet be said with certainty today, as several ships will then have reached the age-limit set in the agreements and to replace them, new units will be under construction or already be completed. The present status is, however, important insofar as that a comparison with the present strength of the fleets of France and Italy shows, that the ratio to the European continental powers originally aimed at by Britain, has turned greatly to her disadvantage. At coming naval negotiations, a new factor will however appear, which cannot be disregarded when making rules for naval armaments: Russia. Since she has set up the most powerful army and the strongest airforce, it is only a matter of time before the Russian fleet will also play an important part in the balance of power in Europe as well as in the Far-East.

H0687-0068

The Russian fleet is even now quite considerable. It is being continuously expanded. The aim of the Soviets is world-revolution. The Red Armed Forces are the carriers of this political creed. And we haust take account of this fact!

Britain fights for the general limitation of naval armament. Germany desire peace and gave this desire expression and form by fixing her naval-strength in the London agreement. Hereby the first positive contribution has been made for the preservation of peace in Europe and in the world, and the prorogatives have been created for conference of the naval powers, planned for this year. It is up to the other powers to follow this good example.

It is however certain, that our navy faces a new development. After the unspeakably sad collapse in 1918 and the laborious reconstruction chained to the Treaty of Versailles during the past 16 years, we are now in a position to become a naval power again, of which we are definitely in need of for the protection and the support of our prestige at sea.

It is natural, that such an expansion of our navy cannot take place at once, but only gradually. For that, besides the approval of the signatories, mainly time and money are necessary, after all ships cannot be produced by magic, and besides the material, the calling up and training of the crews and specialists needed is also necessary.

H0687-0069

That we will receive money and personnel for naval armament is a concern of the whole nation, in which the interest and understanding for the necessity of prestige at sea and naval power must be awakened and strengthened more and more.

"Just in order to follow a peaceful policy, which we want, our navy must represent a powerful factor, which must carry sufficient weight in the eyes of friend and foe. One should not be able to overlook Germany as a power, when it comes to solving international problems touching our vital interests and which are not confined to the European continent. If we want to safeguard our position in the concert of powers, we must have our German say in it."

Don't these words sound like said for today? With this the Reichchancellor v. Hohenlohe in 1897 already, offered his reasons for the demands of the navy. And the Undersecretary of state of the Foreign Office v. Buelow emphasized: "The times, when the German ceded the land to one of his neighbors, to the other one the sea and reserved the heaven for himself, where the true doctrine dwells those times are gone. We do not want to push anybody into the shadow, but we also demand our place in the sun."

Reich association of German prestige at sea v. Wotha *)

Only that people is really free, which recognizes, that the sea is the bridge, without which the unity of the national bond remains incomplete, which aspires to the prestige at sea as a decisive factor for its unity and forced the equality of rights at sea. It is necessary to guide the multiple energies of our people to this high goal into the deepest corner of the inland

*) written by hand into margin.

H0687-0070

and to make way for the fact, that for being a world power, one must be a naval power.

Filed May 16, 1946

H0687-0071

Raeder No. 14

Exhibit Raeder No.

Statement of Attorney at Law, Dr. Siemers:

I herewith certify that the following document:

"German-English agreement concerning the limitation of naval armaments, and the exchange of information concerning naval construction, and explanation,

dated 17 July 1937"

from

"Documents of German Politics"

Volume 5, Berlin 1939,

was correctly copied namely extracts from the pages 179 to 197.

Nuernberg, 23 April 1946

signed: (Dr. W. Siemers)

H0687-0072

German-English Agreement concerning the limitation of the Naval armament, and the exchange of information concerning naval construction and explanation.

dated 17 July 1937.

The German Government and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, desiring to make provision for the limitation of naval armament and for the exchange of information concerning naval construction, have agreed as follows:

Part I - Definitions.

Article 1.

For the purposes of the present agreement, the following expressions are to be understood in the sense hereinafter defined.

A. Standard Water Displacement.

(1) The Standard Water Displacement of a surface vessel is the displacement of the vessel complete, fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every discription that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.

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B. Categories.

.....

C. Over Age.

Vessels of the following categories and sub-categories shall be deemed to be "over age" when the undermentioned number of years have elapsed completion:

H0687-0073

	years
(a) Capital ships.....	26
(b) Aircraft-carriers.....	20
(c) Light surface vessels, sub-categories a) and b):	
1. If laid down before 1 January 1920.....	16
2. If laid down after 31 December 1919.....	20
(d) Light surface vessels, sub-category (c)....	16
(e) Submarines.....	13

D. Month

.....

Part II. Limitation.

Article 2

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Article 4

(1) No capital ship shall exceed 35.000 tons (35.560 metric tons) standard displacement.

(2) No capital ship shall carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 16 in. (406 mm.).

(3) No capital ship of sub-category (a), the standard displacement of which is less than 17.500 tons (17.780 metric tons), shall be laid down or acquired prior to the 1st January, 1943.

(4) No capital ship, the main armament of which consists of guns of less than 10 in. (254 mm.) calibre, shall be laid down or acquired prior to the 1st January, 1943.

Article 5

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Article 7

No submarine shall exceed 2.000 tons (2.032 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 5.1 in. (130 mm) in calibre.

Article 8

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H0687-0074

Article 9

No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6·1 in. (155 mm.) in calibre.

Article 10

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Part III Advance Notification and Exchange of Information

Article 11

(1) Each Contracting Government shall communicate every year to the other Contracting Government information, as hereinafter, provided, regarding its annual programme for the construction and acquisition of all vessels of the categories and sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a) whether or not the vessels concerned are constructed within its own jurisdiction, and periodical information giving details of such vessels and of any alterations to vessels of the said categories or sub-categories already completed.

(2) For the purposes of the present Agreement, information shall be deemed to have reached the German Government on the date on which it is communicated to the German Representative in London, and the Government of the United Kingdom on the date on which it is communicated to the British Representative in Berlin.

(3) This information shall be treated as confidential until published by the Contracting Government supplying it.

Article 12

The information to be furnished under the preceding Article in respect of vessels constructed by or for a Contracting Government shall be given as follows; and so as to reach other Contracting Government within the periods or at the times mentioned:

H0687-0075

(a) Within the first four months of each calendar year, the Annual Programme of construction of all vessels of the following categories and sub-categories, stating the number of vessels of each category or sub-category and, for each vessels, the calibre of the largest gun. The categories and sub-categories in question are:

Capital Ships:
Sub-category (a). Sub-category (b).
Aircraft-Carriers:
Sub-category (a). Sub-category (b).
Light Surface Vessels:
Sub-category (a). Sub-category (b). Sub-category
Submarines.

(b) Not less than four months before the date of the laying of the keel, the following particulars in respect of each such vessel are to be given:

Name or designation;
Category and sub-category;
Standard displacement in tons and metric tons;
Length at waterline at standard displacement;
Extreme beam at or below waterline at standard displacement;
Mean draught at standard displacement;
Designed horse-power;
Designed speed;
Type of machinery;
Type of fuel;
Number and calibre of all guns of 3-in. (76 mm.) calibre and above;
Approximate number of guns of less than 3-in. (76 mm.) calibre;
Number of torpedo tubes;
Whether designed to lay mines;
Approximate number of aircraft for which provision is to be made.

H0687-0076

(c) As soon as possible after the laying-down of the keel of each such vessel, the date on which it was laid.

(d) Within one month after the date of completion of each such vessel, the date of completion together with all the particulars specified in paragraph (b) above relating to the vessel on completion.

(e) Annually during the month of January, in respect of vessels belonging to the categories and sub-categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above.

(I) Information as to any important alterations which proved necessary to make during the preceding year in vessels under construction, in so far as these alterations affect the particulars mentioned in paragraph (b) above.

(II) Information as to any important alterations made during the preceding year in vessels previously completed, in so far as these alterations affect the particulars mentioned in paragraph (b) above.

(III) Information concerning vessels which may have been scrapped or otherwise disposed of during the preceding year. If such vessels are not scrapped, sufficient information shall be given to enable their new status and condition to be determined.

(f) Not less than four months before undertaking such alterations as would cause a completed vessel to come within one of the categories or sub-categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above, or such alterations as would cause a vessel to change from one to another of the said categories; information as to her intended characteristics as specified in paragraph (b) above.

Article 13

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Article 17

Neither Contracting Government shall lay down or acquire any vessel of the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a), which has not previously been included in its Annual Programme of construction or declaration of acquisition for the current year or in any earlier Annual Programme or declaration.

H0687-0077

Article 18

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Part IV. General and Safeguarding Clauses.

Article 22

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Article 24

(1) If either Contracting Government should become engaged in war, such Contracting Government may, if it considers the naval requirements of its defence are materially affected, suspend, in so far as it is concerned, any or all of the obligations of the present Treaty, provided that such Contracting Government shall promptly notify the other Contracting Government that the circumstances require such suspension, and shall specify the obligations it is considered necessary to suspend.

(2) The other Contracting Government shall in such case promptly examine the situation thus presented with a view to deciding on the obligations of the present Agreement, if any, which that Contracting Government may deem it necessary to suspend; and may in consequence suspend, in so far as it is concerned, any or all of the obligations of the present Agreement provided that notice is promptly given to the Contracting Government effecting the suspension under the preceding paragraph of the obligations which it is considered necessary to suspend.

(3) On the cessation of hostilities, the Contracting Governments shall consult together with a view to fixing a date upon which the obligations of the Agreement which have been suspended shall again become operative, and to agreeing upon any amendments in the present Agreement which may be considered necessary.

Article 25

(1) In the event of any vessel not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions as to standard displacement and armament prescribed by Articles 4,5,6 (1) and 7 of the present Agreement being authorised,

H0687-0078

constructed or acquired by a Power not a party to the present Agreement, each Contracting Government reserves the right to depart if, and to the extent to which, it considers such departures necessary in order to meet the requirements of its national security:

(a) During the remaining period of the Agreement, from the limitations and restrictions of Article 3.4.5. 6. paragraph 1, and 7; and

(b) During the current year, from its Annual Programme of construction and declarations of acquisition.

This right shall be exercised in accordance with the following provisions:

(2) Either Contracting Government who considers it necessary that such right should be exercised, shall notify the other Contracting Government to that effect, stating precisely the nature and extent of the proposed departures and the reasons therefor.

(3) The Contracting Governments shall thereupon consult together and endeavour to reach an agreement with a vie to reducing to a minimum the extent of the departures which may be made.

(4) On the expiration of a period of three months from the date of the first of any notifications which may have been given under paragraph 2 above, each of the Contracting Governments shall, subject to any agreement which may have been reached to the contrary, be entitled to depart during the remaining period of the present Agreement from the limitations and restrictions prescribed in Articles 3,4,5,6, paragraph 1, and 7 thereof.

(5) On the expiration of the period mentioned in the preceding paragraph, either Contracting Government shall be at liberty, subject to any agreement which may have been reache during the consultations provided for in papragraph 3 above, and on informing the other Contracting Government, to depart from its Annual Programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition and to alter the characteristics of any vessels building or which have already appeared in its Programme or declarations.

H0687-0079

(6) In such event, no delay in the acquisition, the laying of the keel, or the altering of any vessel shall be necessary by reason of any of the provisions of Part III of the present Agreement. The particulars mentioned in Article 12 (b) shall, however, be communicated to the other Contracting Government before the keels of any vessels are laid. In the case of acquisition, information relating to the vessel shall be given under the provisions of Article 14.

Article 26

(1) If the requirements of the national security of either Contracting Government should, in the opinion of that Government, be materially affected by any change of circumstances, other than those provided for in Article 24 and 25 of the present Agreement, such Contracting Government shall have the right to depart for the current year from its Annual Programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition. The amount of construction by either Contracting Government, within the limitations and restrictions thereof, shall not, however, constitute a change of circumstances for the purposes of the present Article. The above-mentioned right shall be exercised in accordance with the following provisions:

(2) Such Contracting Government shall, if it desire to exercise the above-mentioned right, notify the other Contracting Government to that effect, stating in what respects it proposes to depart from its Annual Programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition, giving reasons for the proposed departure.

(3) The Contracting Governments will thereupon consult together with a view to agreement as to whether any departures are necessary in order to meet the situation.

(4) On the expiration of a period three months from the date of the first of any notifications which may have been given under paragraph 2 above , each of the Contracting Government shall, subject to any agreement which may have been reached to the contrary, be entitled to depart from its Annual Programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition, provided notice is promptly given to the other Contracting Government stating precisely in what respects it is proposed so to depart.

H0687-0080

(5) In such event, no delay in the acquisition, the laying of the keel, or the altering of any vessel shall be necessary by reason of any of the provisions of Part III of the present Agreement. The particulars mentioned in Article 12 (b) shall, however, be communicated to the other Contracting Government before the keels of any vessels are laid. In the case of acquisition, information relating to the vessel shall be given under the provisions of Article 14.

Part V. Final Clauses.

Article 27

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In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in London the 17th day of July, 1937, in the German and English languages both texts being equally authentic.

For the German Government: Joachim von Ribbentrop.
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Anthony Eden. Duff Cooper.

Declaration.

The Undersigned, duly authorised to that effect by their respective Government, have agreed on the following Declaration relative to certain matters arising out of the Agreement regarding the Limitation of Naval Armament (hereinafter styled the Agreement of 1935) embodied in the Notes exchanged between the German Government and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the 18 June 1935.

Article 1

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Article 2

The present Declaration does not relate to submarines which are and remain regulated exclusively by paragraph 2 (f) of the Agreement of 1935. Nothing in the present Declaration shall effect the right or obligations of either Government arising under that paragraph.

H0687-0081

Filed May 16, 1946

Raeder No. 15

Roll of documents 1946 No. 558.

Stated at Hamburg on the 6th (sixth) day of February 1946 (nineteenhundredandfourtysix). ----------

To me, the undersigned notary public at Hamburg

Dr. jur. Ulrich Sieveking

came into my office Jungfernstieg No. 25, today

Dr. Ing. h.c. Wilhelm Friedrich Mathias Suechting, born on 5 October 1881, residing at Hamburg-Blankenese, Falkensteinerufer No. 76,

retired ship building director,----------

known to the notary----------

and stated and deposited:

I herewith certify the correctness of my following statement in lieu of oath, with the remark that this affidavit is to be used before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg:

I am the former ship building director of the shipbuilding-yard of Blohm & Voss in Hamburg, I was with this firm from 1907 to 1945, and I am conversant with all the questions of construction of capital- and merchant ships, especially as engineer I was informed in detail about the construction of capital ships for the German navy. Dr. Walter Siemers, attorney at law, at Hamburg, presented to me the document C 23, dated 18 February 1938, with the request to express my opinion about it. From this document it can be seen that the navy - contrary to the prior agreement - informed the British about the displacement and the draught of the capital ships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" and in addition of some more designed capital ships of about 20% less than they actually had.

In order to explain, why these information was given, I state the following:

I believe, the informations given to the British, that according to naval agreement 4, had to be given four months before keel was laid down, was based upon the fact that the capital ships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" in the beginning were designed to be constructed with the given displacement of 26.000 tons and a draught of 7,50 meters, and the capital ship F ("Bismark") with a displacement of 35,000 tons and a draught of 7,90 m..

H0687-0082

If these capital ships were latter built with a greater displacement and a greater draught, these changes were made upon orders or requests of the Navy that appeared during the working out of the plans and had to be fulfilled by the construction office. The changes were based upon the viewpoint again and again pointed out by the Navy, to construct the capital ships in such a way that would be - come as nearly unsinkable as possible. The increase of the tonnage was meant, to increase the offensive power of the ship, but it was done for defensive- and protectiv purposes. As for capital ships, the Navy increasingly in the course of time made a point of having the body of the ship divided into more compartments in order to make the ship as unsinkable as possible and the protection - in case of water flooding the ship - as good as possible.

Therefore the new battleships were built with a great width, very many bulk-heads (with only about 10 m distance), and manylength- and transverse bulk-heads outside the torpedo bulkhead. At the same time the strength of the vertical- as well as the horizontal armour, as far as I am informed, are greater and divided on wider spaces, as is used by other Navies, in order to be protected thus also against heavy calibres from great distances. These demands of the Navy lead us to increase the displacement beyond the above mentioned figures of tonnages.

As a matter of fact, these demands of the Navy based upon defensive ideas were successful as shown by the fight against the capital-ship " Bismarck ": only a long time after destruction of the offensive weapons was the sinking of the wreck possible.

The contrast to it was the sinking of the battleship " Hood " which was owing to inferiority of her defensive armament destroyed by one salvo of the " Bismarck ".

These defensive measures, especially the dividing up of the ship through increasing the number of bulk-heads, resulted as a technical measure in a greater displacement, and thus necessarily a greater draught.

H0687-0083

Furthermore, numerous changes in the construction during the building on the new capital ships were ordered by the Navy in an annsual degree, that caused the building of an essentially different ship than it was intended in the beginning.

Especially there have to be mentioned the innumerable requests in the technical field, that made the technical lay out more and more complicated; especially the installation of many hundreds of kilometers of strongest cable became necessary.

My attention was called to the importance of an affidavit by the undersigned Notary Public.

This protocol, the original of which remains with me, was read, approved of by the participant, and signed with his own signature, as follows, and also signed and sealed by me, the Notary Public.

signed Dr. Wilhelm Suechting

L.S. " Dr. Sieveking

(not.)

??

Fees: RKO. of 25 November 1935

Value: RM 3 000.--

Fee Par.	26.43	RM 16.--
Tax		" 0,32
		RM 16.32

signed Dr. S.

Of the above statement the first copy is herewith made out.
This copy is issued to Mr. Dr. Ing. h.c. Wilhelm Friedrich Mathias Suechting.

Hamburg, 7 (seventh) February 1946 (nineteenhundredfourtysix)

signed Dr. Sieveking

seal

Copy Par. 138 RKO
without charge.

Filed May 16, 1946

H0687-0084

Raeder No. 16

Statement of Attorney Dr. Siemers.

I, herewith certify that the following document :

"Announcement concerning the modification of the German-Anglo Naval Agreement of 1937 ", London Protocol of 30 June 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt (Official Gazette), Part II, 1938 edition,

has been copied correctly from pages 914 and 915.

Nuernberg, 17 April 1946

signed Dr. W. Siemers

H0687-0085

Announcement concerning modification of the German-Anglo Naval Agreement of 1937. Dated 28 December 1938.

On 30 June 1938 representatives of the German Reich and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have signed a protocol for the modification of Article 4 paragraph 1 of the German-Anglo agreement on the limitation of naval armament and the exchange of information regarding naval construction, dated 17 July 1937.

The protocol is herewith published below.

It came into force on the day on which it was signed.

This announcement is made following the announcement of 21 December 1937 (Reich Gesetzblatt (Official Gazette) II, page 701).

Berlin, 28 December 1938

For the Reich Foreign Minister

Freiherr von Weizsaecker.

H0687-0086

Protocol

Whereas by Article 4 (1) of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement signed in London on the 17th July, 1937, it is provided that no capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement :

And whereas by reason of Article 4 (2) of the said Agreement the maximum calibre of gun carried by capital ships is 16 in. (406 mm);

And whereas on the 31st March, 1938, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland gave notice under paragraph (2) of Article 25 of the said Agreement of its decision to exercise the right provided for in paragraph (1) of the said Article to depart from the limitations and restrictions of the Agreement in regard to the upper limits of capital ships of sub-category (a) ;

And whereas consultations have taken place as provided in paragraph (3) of Article 25, with a view to reaching agreement in order to reduce to a minimum the extent of the departures from the limitations and restrictions of the Agreement;

The undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have agreed as follows : -

1. As from this day's date the figure of 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons in Article 4 (1) of the said Agreement shall be replaced by the figure of 45,000 tons (45,720 metric tons).

2. The figure of 16 in. (406 mm.) in Article 4 (2) remains unaltered.

H0687-0087

3. The present Protocol, of which the German and English texts shall both be equally authentic, shall come into force on this day's date.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present Protocol.

Done in London the 30th day of June, 1938.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland :

Alexander Gadogan

For the German Government :

Herbert von Dirksen.

H0687-0088

OBJECTIONS BY PROSECUTION TO RAEDER DOCUMENTS

A. Source of material of no probative value.

No.	Book	Page
66	4	3
101	5	125
102	5	129
103	5	132
104	5	135
105	5	137
106	5	140
107	5	142

B. Irrelevant to issues in case

39	3	195
63	3	285
64	3	287
99	5	112
100	5	117
102-7 as in A(5)		129-142

C. Rejected in Ribbentrop's case

38 (Ri 255)	3	193
50 (Ri 251)	3	250
55 (Ri 253)	3	263
58 (Ri 254)	3	271

D. In same series as rejected Ribbentrop's documents

29 (Ri 246)	2	162
56	3	265
57	3	267
60	3	278
62	3	283

E. Tu quoque though mostly on destruction of oilfields or blocking of Danube

31	2	173
32	2	175
36	3	185
37	3	187
39	3	195
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99	5	112
101	5	125

G. Irrelevant to German guilt for aggression against Norway

59	3	273
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70	4	34
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	Re: Indictment concerning Norway		
Reichsgesetzblatt 1910 page 359	Hague Convention concerning the rights and duties of the neutrals in case of naval war, paragraph 1 and 2	1910	65 ✓
Expert opinion	Dr.Hermann Mosler;The Norway action in international law	23.3.1946	66 ✓
UK 79 Annex 4	Rosenberg to Raeder	13.12.1939	67 ✓
White Book No4. Group B Doc.1 Doc.2 Doc.3 Doc.4	Telegrams from the control book of the British consul in Narvik	29.12.1939 31.12.1939 2.1.1940 9.1.1940	68 Rejected
C 21 GB 194	War diary of the Naval War Command	13.1.1940	69 ✓
White Book No6 Doc.18	Daladier to the French Ambassador in London, Corbin	17.1.1940	70 Rejected
White Book No.4 Group C Doc.2	Geoffrey Cooke to the Chief of the Shipping Control Office in Narvik	31.1.1940	72 Rejected
White Book No.4 Group D Doc.1	Notes of the French Naval Attache in Oslo	8.2.1940	
White Book No.4 Group C Doc.1	The British Assistant Naval Attache in Stockholm to the British Consul in Narvik	14.2.1940	74 Rejected
White Book No.4 Group E Doc.1 Doc.4	Letter of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with enclosures	17.2.1940 15.2.1940	75 ✓
White Book No.6 Doc.21	Daladier to the French Ambassador in London, Corbin	21.2.1940	77 ✓
Extract from:	War diary of the Naval War Command part A 1940	4.3.1940	78 ✓
White Book No.6 Doc.23	Notes of the Commander in Chief of the French Army General Gamelin	10.3.1940	79 ✓

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Description	Contents	Date	Exh. Rader No.
White Book No.6 Doc.24	Minutes of the meeting of the Scandinavia Commission of the Inter Allied Military Research Committee	11.3.1940	80 ✓
Photo Copy of British Admiralty	War diary of War Naval Command page 139,140,141, and 142	20.-23. 3. 1940	81 ✓
Extract from:	War diary of Naval War Command part A 1940	27.3.1940	82 ✓
White Book No.6 Doc.30	6th meeting of the Supreme Council on	28.3.1940	83 ✓
White Book No.6 Doc.49	Reynaud to Chamberlain (draft)	1.5.1940	84 ✓
White Book No.6 Doc.33	General Lelong to General Gamelin	2.4.1940	85 ✓
Extract from:	War diary of Naval War Command part C vol. VIII 1940	6.4.1940	86 ✓
White Book No.4 Group B Doc.12	The Admiralty to the British Consul, Narvik	6.4.1940	87 Rejected
White Book No.5 Doc.20	British order concerning preparation for the occupation of the north-Swedish iron ore mines from Narvik	6.4.1940	88 ✓
Extract from:	War diary of Naval War Command part A 1940	8.4.1940	89 ✓
" "	dto.	8.4.1940,	90 ✓
White Book No.6 Doc.37	The Commander in Chief of the French Navy Admiral Darlan to Daladier	12.4.1940	91 ✓
Doc.d.dtsch. Politik vol.8/I,1940	v.Ribbentrop to the foreign press in the Foreign Office	9.4.1940	92 ✓
"	v.Ribbentrop to the Diplomatic Corps and the Press	27.4.1940	97 ✓
Extract from:	War diary of Naval War Command part A 1940	26.4.1940	98 ✓
White Book No.6 Doc. 44	9th meeting of the Supreme Council in London on	27.4.1940	99 Rejected
White Book No. 6 Doc. 35	Meeting of the French War Committee on	9.4.1940	100 ✓

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White Book No.5 Doc.8	Statement of a French prisoner of war about presence of French troops in Belgium before the 10.5.1940	16.5.1940	106 Rejected
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Letter	Erich Katz to Dr.Siemers with 2 enclosures dated	22.11.1945 6.1.1940	122
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